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Chinese investment in Australia is emerging as an important part of the Australia-
China economic relationship. This paper overviews the major characteristics of 
Chinese investment in Australia up to the present - its volume, form, sectoral 
distribution and the major players. It then discusses the policies that have been 
driving recent increases and those that are likely to have a more profound impact 
over the longer term.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The backbone of the Australia-China economic relationship has long been the trade of 
goods and services and this continues to flourish. China has now overtaken the U.S. 
and Japan to become Australia’s number one trading partner with bilateral 
merchandise and services trade set to exceed $A60 billion in 2007. Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) data show that in the 12 months from July 2006 to June 2007, 
Australia’s merchandise exports to China amounted to $A24.8 billion (up from $6 
billion in 2000) while merchandise imports from China reached $A29.2 billion (up 
from $A9 billion in 2000). Thus, not only have trade ties between Australia and China 
grown rapidly, they have remained roughly in balance. During this same period, 
Australia’s trade deficit vis-à-vis the U.S. and trade surplus vis-à-vis Japan stood at 
around $A16 billion in both cases.  Australia’s merchandise exports to China are 
dominated by raw materials from the mining and energy sector, reflecting the huge 
increase in demand for these fundamental production inputs as economic output in 
China has surged, as well as an increased reliance by China on imports to fill the 
domestic demand-supply gap. China has not been alone in seeking to secure access to 
Australia’s natural resources and has faced stiff regional competition from the likes of 
Japan, Korea and India. It is this competition that has begun to usher in a new phase 
of the Australia-China economic relationship - one where Chinese investment in 
Australia features prominently. It has been reported that in early 2007 Chinese 
companies were studying more than 15 minerals and energy projects in Australia 
worth around $US10 billion (IHT, 13/02/02007).  
 
Given the preponderance of trade flows in the past, the subject of investment 
flows between Australia and China has received little attention to date. This paper   2
seeks to contribute to filling this gap. It begins by providing an overview of the major 
characteristics of Chinese investment in Australia up to the present - its volume, form, 
sectoral distribution and the major players. It then discusses the policies that have 
been driving recent increases and those that are likely to have a more profound impact 
over the longer term.     
 
2. An Overview of Chinese Investment in Australia 
Table 1 presents ABS data over the period 1991-2006 to illustrate some of the salient 
features of Chinese investment in Australia to date.   
 
Firstly, when viewed alongside trade flows, the value of investment flows has 
been modest. Over the entire period, inflows of Chinese investment averaged just 
$A180 million annually. By 2006, the accumulated stock of Chinese investment in 
Australia stood at $A3.5 billion, on par with that of Taiwan, which is listed as a 
separate investor country in ABS statistics. The stock of the number one investor 
country in Australia, the U.S., was $A362.8 billion, and the combined stock of all 
countries was A$1.4 trillion. China’s 0.25 per cent share of this total stock made it 
only Australia’s 17
th most important foreign investor. Hong Kong (SAR of China) 
held a more substantial investment stock of $A38.5 billion. Given the porous border 
between Hong Kong and the mainland, some proportion of Hong Kong’s stock might 
include capital of mainland origin.   
 
Secondly, in stark contrast to trade flows, investment flows have not trended 
upwards. After averaging $A279 million annually during the 1990s, Chinese 
investment in Australia actually turned to dis-investment over the period 2000-2005   3
before recovering in 2006. In 1991, China’s stock of foreign investment stood at 
$A1.4 billion, which made it the 14
th largest investor country in Australia at the time.  
 
Thirdly, while recent years have brought several high profile instances of 
Chinese direct investment in Australia, prior to this most Chinese capital entered in 
forms other than direct investment. The bulk has come under the category of “Other 
Investment”, which includes trade credits, loans, and currency and bank deposit 
holdings by Chinese entities in Australia.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
ABS data do not disaggregate Chinese investment in Australia according to 
economic sector. Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) data regarding investment 
proposals provide some indication, although mainly only with respect to larger, direct 
investments. Not all foreign investments require FIRB approval and not all approved 
foreign investment proposals need necessarily reach full fruition. Table 2 shows FIRB 
approved investment proposals from China by sector since the early 1990s. It 
indicates that Chinese direct investment has been heavily concentrated in just two 
sectors – real estate; and mineral exploration and development and resources 
processing. With respect to the latter sector, a recent spike in investment is evident in 
the $A6.8 billion of approved investment in the latest year, which far surpassed 
approved investment in any other year or sector in the data set.  
Table 2 here. 
According to the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT), which ranks direct investors according to annual revenues, the three   4
largest Chinese direct investors in Australia are China Trust and Investment Company 
(CITIC) Australia, CITIC Australia Trading and Sinosteel Australia. CITIC Australia 
has annual revenues of $A677 million and is a wholly owned subsidiary of the CITIC 
Group, one of China’s largest state-owned companies. CITIC Australia was originally 
formed in 1986 to hold a 10 per cent stake in the Portland aluminium smelter in 
Victoria that at the time was worth $A140 million and was China’s largest single 
overseas investment. Aluminium and traditional raw material interests such as coal 
continue to weigh heavily in CITIC Australia’s investment portfolio. However, in 
light of China’s growing energy demands and the recent nuclear pacts signed between 
the two countries, CITIC Australia also recently took a 7.5 per cent stake in Southern 
Gold, an Adelaide-based gold and uranium explorer. CITIC Australia Trading has 
annual revenues of $A613 million. Aside from being directly involved in the export 
and import business where it focuses on the export of base metals and minerals from 
Australia to China, it is also involved in providing trade finance to support the 
burgeoning flow of goods and services between the two countries. Sinosteel Australia 
has annual revenues of A$135 million and is a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of 
Sinosteel Corporation, one of China’s largest steel traders. Sinosteel Australia was 
formed in 1987 and its centrepiece investment is a 40 per cent interest in the Channar 
iron ore joint venture with the Australian resource company, Hamersley Australia. 
Earlier this year Sinosteel Australia also began investing in the uranium industry in a 
joint venture with PepinNini Minerals of Australia.  
  
3. Drivers of Chinese Investment Abroad 
It is well known that since the Open Door Policy was initiated in 1979, China has 
become one of world’s leading host countries of foreign investment, particularly   5
foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data, in 2005 alone it attracted $US72 billion in 
FDI, second only to the U.S., which attracted $US99 billion. However, while the 
Open Door Policy led to the barriers restricting inward FDI being reduced, controls 
over most other types of capital flows remained largely in place. The impact of these 
controls can be seen in the official Balance of Payments data presented in Figure 1. 
Until 1995, Chinese investment abroad remained low and stable.  Official data do not 
tell the full story as some Chinese capital was able to move abroad through unofficial 
channels such as trade mis-invoicing. For example, Gunter (2004) estimated that 
capital flight from China might have reached as high as $US148 billion in 1998. 
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that capital controls continue to bite in terms of 
restricting capital flows. Modelling by Laurenceson and Tang (2007) estimated that in 
the early 2000s the volume of non-FDI capital crossing China’s borders was only 55 
per cent of that which would be expected if its capital account were fully open. 
Capital account liberalization has picked up pace on a number of fronts in more recent 
years and this sets the stage for greater flows of Chinese capital abroad in the future.  
Figure 1 here 
3.1. The Go Abroad Policy 
   In the late 1990s, the Chinese government embarked upon a Go Abroad 
policy that encouraged Chinese companies, particularly large ones, to look beyond the 
domestic market and engage in direct investment abroad. As China’s raw materials 
shortage has worsened and pressure on the exchange rate has intensified, the Go 
Abroad policy has become increasingly prominent in policy speeches. The objectives 
of the Go Abroad policy are chiefly to secure access to important raw materials, 
which is the manifestation of the policy most commonly seen in Australia, and the   6
acquisition of advanced technology and brand names such as when the Chinese 
computer manufacturer Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC division in 2004. The government 
also sometimes provides the financial wherewithal for companies to expand overseas, 
albeit most of the companies investing abroad are usually at least partly government-
owned themselves. For example, when Shanghai Auto acquired a stake in the Korean 
manufacturer Ssangyong Motors, 66 per cent of the acquisition was financed through 
preferential loans from three state-owned banks (Lunding, 2006). The impact of the 
Go Abroad policy can be seen in Figure 1. China’s FDI abroad jumped from $US1.8 
billion in 2004 to $US17.8 billion in 2006. By the end of the third quarter 2006, 
China’s overseas FDI stock exceeded $US70 billion (People’s Daily, 19/12/2006). 
The potential for China’s FDI abroad to expand further is indicated by UNCTAD’s 
outward FDI performance index. This index ranks countries by dividing their share in 
global FDI outflows by their share in global GDP.  In 2005, China ranked a modest 
71
st out of 141 countries.   
 
3.2 Growth and Diversification of Reserve Assets 
Against the backdrop of a heavily managed exchange rate, a large trade 
surplus (equal to 8 per cent of GDP at the end of June 2007) and speculative capital 
inflows, China now holds the world’s largest stock of foreign exchange reserves 
(equal to $US1.33 trillion at the end of June 2007). To maintain the value of the RMB 
to the $US, China’s state bank dominated financial system has invested heavily in 
$U.S. assets, in particular, U.S. Treasury bonds. The spike in investment of this type 
since 2004 is clearly seen in Figure 1. Australia has not been directly affected by this 
outflow of capital although China’s willingness to buy these assets has contributed to 
the low interest rate environment in the U.S. Holding reserves predominantly in $US   7
has exposed China to a growing foreign exchange risk and when combined with the 
fact that these assets are low-yielding has prompted the authorities to begin taking 
steps to diversify the form in which reserves are held (Frankel and Wei, 2007). One 
institutional development that reflects this intention was announced in early 2007 by 
China’s Finance Minister who outlined plans to establish a State Investment Company 
modelled along the lines of the Singaporean government’s Temasek Holdings (IHT, 
09/03/2007). While still a work in progress, the new company has the potential to 
emerge as a major overseas investor, including in Australian assets. The Chinese 
official media has reported that $US200 billion in Chinese government treasury bonds 
will be issued to kick start its operations (People’s Daily, 16/03/2007). Some foreign 
commentators have speculated that these bonds might be sold to the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC), the country’s central bank, in exchange for a portion of the foreign 
exchange reserves now held on its balance sheet (Financial Times, 27/06/2007). An 
existing Chinese government agency recently purchased a $US3 billion stake minority 
stake in Blackstone, a U.S private equity group, on behalf of the State Investment 
Company that is still being set up. In discussing the deal the Chinese buyer stated that 
they expected the State Investment Company would engage predominantly in 
portfolio investment such as in funds that track broad stock indices or purchase 
minority stakes in foreign companies rather than direct investment and takeovers 
(New York Times, 21/05/2007). This sits at odds with certain alarmist reports 
appearing in the local press that the new company might seek to buy marquee 
Australian companies such as BHP (e.g., Herald Sun, 07/06/2007). It also reflects an 
acceptance by the Chinese government side that any attempt by a Chinese government 
agency to buy a controlling stake in a foreign company is likely to be met with stiff 
regulatory opposition abroad. There are several precedents for this contention such as   8
in 2004 when a bid by CNOOC, a Chinese state-owned oil company, for Unocoal, a 
U.S oil company, was blocked by Congressional opposition.  
 
3.3. The Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme 
The Chinese government has also begun loosening controls over Chinese 
individuals investing abroad. In 2005, the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 
(QDII) scheme was launched. This is the counterpart program to the Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme launched in 2003 that gave foreigners 
limited access to China’s capital markets. QDII allows Chinese individuals to invest 
in overseas securities through licensed institutions, each of which is issued with an 
allowable quota for making such investments. Initially, the scheme was limited to 
domestic banks investing in overseas fixed income products. More recently, it has 
been expanded to include securities companies and fund managers and the menu of 
allowable investment products to include overseas equities. The aggregate QDII quota 
now stands at around $US19 billion, although only a fraction of this has been utilised 
in view of booming domestic equity markets and the gradually appreciating RMB 
(China Daily, 24/05/2007). Current rules only permit investment in equities and 
equity funds authorized by a supervisory authority with which the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The 
Hong Kong authorities are the only ones to have done so to date. Nonetheless, over 
time some QDII money might begin flowing into the likes of the Australian Stock 
Exchange.  
 
4. Conclusion   9
The Australia-China economic relationship is set to be further bolstered by greater 
flows of Chinese investment to Australia. In the short term, these flows will likely be 
an escalation of the type recently seen in the natural resources sector that have been 
prompted by the Chinese government’s Go Abroad policy. Such investment would 
receive a further boost if a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed between the two 
countries given that some Australian raw material exports still face tariff barriers, 
albeit their level has declined since China joined the WTO in 2001. In the longer term, 
more flows can be expected in the form of portfolio investment as developments such 
as the State Investment Company and QDII make their mark. The potential for future 
growth is vast. Direct capital markets in China remain under-developed and Chinese 
individuals currently have in excess of $US2 trillion sitting in bank account savings 
deposits earning negative real rates of interest (Wall Street Journal, 27/06/2007). As 
China’s capital account continues to open, it can be expected that some of these 
savers will seek out higher returns aboard. The strong trade ties and stable political 
relationship between Australia and China positions Australia well to become a 
significant beneficiary of this liberalization process.     10
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Table 1. Chinese investment in Australia, 1991-2006 ($A millions) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total    585 482 831 359  -907 -1058 1148 277 795 -58 -126  -370 218 -601 28 1280
FDI 11 29  -28 84  -33 -196 44 31 -21 6 -21 12 n.p -80 -58 306
Portfolio 
investment 
5 7 4  4 5 3  8 5 9  2 7 5   - 8 7 5 n . p1112 - 2   n . p n . p n . p n . p n . p
Other 
investment 
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.p 1103 245 813 n.p -112  -433 174 -693 -280 666
Notes –  
1. n.a – not available; n.p – not published. In some cases n.p data can be inferred as it should be able to be calculated as a residual.  
2. There is a sharp decline in reported portfolio investment after 1995. This appears to be a data reporting artefact whereby the ABS began reclassifying “Portfolio investment 
– debt securities” as “Other investment”.  
Source – ABS Cat 5352.0 
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Table 2. FIRB Approved Chinese Investment in Australia ($A millions) 
 

















1992-93 -  - - - -  - - - -
1993-94 927  - - 1 42  426 16 36 522
1994-95 267  - - 6 52  137 31 - 225
1995-96 102  10 - 3 5  176 5 12 210
1996-97 -  - - - -  - - - -
1997-98 -  - - - -  - - - -
1998-99 259  35 - 5 450  212 10 - 720
2000-01 -  - - - -  - - - -
2001-02 237  - - 47 20  234 - 10 311
2002-03 -  - - - -  - - - -
2003-04 170  - - 2 971  121 - 5 1100
2004-05 206  2 - - 39  181 36 6 264
2005-06 437  - - 223 6758  279 - - 7259
Notes – 
1. With respect to the number of approvals, – indicates that in that particular year the number of Chinese proposals was not sufficiently large to warrant listing as a separate 
country in the FIRB’s reporting tables. With respect to economic sectors, - indicates that the volume of investment was either zero or sufficiently close to zero for reporting 
purposes.  
Source – FIRB Annual Reports.   13



























































































































FDI Porfolio Investment Other Investment  
Source – International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
 